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Financial crisis, Regulation,  
Financial architecture
Since the summer of 2007, participants in financial markets have been confronted 
by a crisis of their own making. In order to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis in 
the future, the G-20 nations, at their finance summit in Washington on 15 November 
2008, resolved to “ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are 
regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances.” However, the 
elimination of loopholes as a matter of principle does not in itself provide a roadmap 
for the reconfiguration of financial markets. DIW Berlin is promoting an agenda 
of nine principles for regulatory reform. Item 1 through 3 focus on the prevention 
of coordination failures at the micro and the macro level as well as establishing 
appropriate incentives front and center; item 4 through 6 sketch out opportunities 
and limits for the future role of government; item 7 and 8 focus on oversight. Finally, 
item 9 calls for a stronger emphasis on equity financing and makes an appeal for the 
insight that financing constraints based upon credit worthiness ultimately serve to 
protect the financial system.
The current financial crisis can be traced back to severe distortions in US housing 
and financial markets. During the housing-market boom that was fueled in no 
small part by the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policy, mortgages were 
granted to a large number of homeowners of questionable creditworthiness (sub-
prime mortgages). Enticing loan offers with initially low interest rates and payment 
requirements that reset with much stricter terms were widespread. Credit limits 
for borrowers generally rose automatically with rising home values. The repeated 
refinancing of homes at 100% of their value was not unusual in the US during this 
period. With the Federal Reserve’s incremental increase of interest rates from one 
percent (in mid-2004) to 5.25 percent (by mid-2007), the interest on variable-rate 
mortgages linked to the prime rate also rose sharply.
Often, mortgage loans would be bundled, tranched, given a rating, and finally sold 
all over the world in the form of mortgage-backed securities with different credit 
ratings (see Figure 1).1 So-called senior tranches (AAA to A) have the highest ratings. 
According to estimates by Fitch, a rating agency, the default probability of these 
tranches lies between 0.061 and 0.304 percent. Mezzanine tranches, by contrast, 
have a default risk between one percent (BBB) and as high as nine percent (B). The 
equity tranche, which is unrated, has the greatest probability of default.
1  In general, a security that is backed by loans is classified as Asset Backed Security.Agenda for a New  Financial Market Architecture
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Securitized instruments turned incendiary when 
investors, using special purpose vehicles (SPVs), 
pooled the higher-return mezzanine tranches into 
new asset-backed structures, so-called mezzanine 
collateralized debt obligations (mezzanine CDOs). 
New ratings across the entire spectrum of credit-
worthiness were then obtained from rating agencies 
for each individual CDO tranche. The super-senior 
tranche, with an estimated default probability of 
0.061 percent, accounted for 50 to 60 percent of 
the total market volume (see Figure 1).2 Currently, 
all tranches—including the super-senior tranche—
of many real estate-backed mezzanine CDOs are 
considered highly speculative.
This process was repeated as investors resold CDOs, 
creating veritable chains of securitization. Losses 
are initially absorbed at each level by the equity 
tranche. While the issuer of the security should have 
been retained this tranche, apparently it was often 
possible to unload even the most speculative portion 
of CDOs to risk- and return-hungry investors, such 
as hedge funds.3
Some purchasers of CDOs were legally independent 
special purpose vehicles, beyond the balance sheets 
of their parent banks, and which relied on short-term 
refinancing. The assets of the special purpose vehi-
cle, customarily senior tranches, served as security. 
The long-term nature of this investment required a 
continuous rollover of short-term credit or securities 
in the money market.
Collapse of real-estate prices
By the second half of 2006, housing prices in the 
US began to fall across the board (Figure 2). In the 
months that followed, credit defaults at lower credit 
ratings rose continuously. The crisis became acute 
in July 2007 when the investment bank Bear Stearns 
was forced to close two of its hedge funds that had 
invested in mezzanine CDOs. Shortly afterwards, 
for the first time, Standard & Poors downgraded 
mortgage-backed securities issued in the boom year 
of 2006.4 With additional losses in value, further 
downgrades soon followed. The devaluation of their 
securities cut off many special purpose vehicles 
2  Swiss Federal Banking Commission: “Subprime-Krise: Untersuchung 
der EBK zu den Ursachen der Wertberichtigungen der UBS AG.” Septem-
ber 2008.
3  Brunnermeier,  M.K.:  Deciphering  the  Liquidity  and  Credit  Crunch 
2007-08.  www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/liquidity_
credit_crunch.pdf. In the United States, even pension funds invested in 
these extremely risky and therefore very high yield equity tranches: “The 
Poison in Your Pension,” by David Evans: Bloomberg Markets, July 2007, 
www.bloomberg.com/news/marketsmag/pensions.pdf. Cf. also Bank of 
England: Financial Stability Report. October 2008.
4 Rudolph, B.: “Lehren aus den Ursachen und dem Verlauf der internatio-
nalen Finanzkrise. Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche 
Forschung.” vol. 60, 2008, 713-741.
Figure 1
From Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) to Mezzanine 











































































1 MBS = Mortgage-backed securities.
Quelle: Darstellung des DIW Berlin, angelehnt an Eidgenössische Bankenkommission.   DIW Berlin 2008
Figure 2
Case-Schiller Home Price Index for  















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Abbildung 1
Case Shiller Houseprice Index für 20 US-ameri-
kanische Metropolen – Composite-20 SPCS2OR
Quelle: DIW Berlin 2008
Source: Standard & Poor’s/ 
Case-Schiller Home Price Indices.   DIW Berlin 2008Agenda for a New  Financial Market Architecture
43 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 7/2009
from the liquidity supplied by the money market. 
The parent owner was then required to take on 
responsibility for refinancing in order to keep the 
special purpose vehicle from becoming insolvent. 
This overstrained many banks. In Germany, the first 
casualties were the Industrie-Kreditbank (IKB) in 
July 2007 and then in August, the Sachsen Landes-
bank. Both of these banks were compelled to appeal 
to their current owners and then to their home states 
or the national government for additional lines of 
credit and direct equity investment.
Rising need for liquidity and the drying up 
of the money market
With the ratings of many securitized products down-
graded, hedge funds, which had financed their CDO 
investments with bank loans, short sales and re-
purchase agreements, were confronted by increased 
margin calls and demands for increased collateral 
from their brokers. In addition, higher redemption 
of hedge fund shares by investors drove up their 
liquidity requirements. As long as there was still 
a market, investments were converted to cash. In 
the process, however, it soon became apparent that 
non-standardized structured products could not be 
sold. As a consequence, their market value began to 
fall quickly towards very low values. Increasingly, 
fire sales of liquid assets such as stocks occurred 
und stocks prices began to decline (see Figures 3 
and 4).
The liquidity requirements of banks, insecurity re-
garding government readiness for rescue, mounting 
write-offs due to an ongoing downgrading of the 
mortgage related securities in the banks’ books, and, 
additionally, falling asset prices together with dimi-
nishing confidence in market participants slowly 
converged to bring the money market to a complete 
standstill.5 The tendency for precautionary hoarding 
of liquidity and the fear of default drove up risk 
premiums, and not merely for long-term lending.  
In order to prevent the collapse of the system, cen-
tral banks began to inject liquidity into commercial 
banks all over the world. For a moment it seemed 
that this might calm the markets; as 2007 came to 
a close, the DAX once again climbed over 8,000 
points. With the end of each business quarter, ho-
wever, and the next upcoming expiration date of 
short-term financing from the money market, even 
5 Claims are securitized in the bank’s trading book and have to be ba-
lanced against market value according to International Financial Repor-
ting Standards (IFRS). Appreciation and depreciation in value must be 
entered as profit and loss, respectively. Claims in the banking book can be 
settled against the purchase price. In order to limit the requirement for 
write-offs, the EU Parliament recently allowed banks to shift securitized 
instruments onto their banking books, www.iasb.org.
stronger central bank intervention signaled the on-
going need for liquidity in the banking sector. As a 
result of the bankruptcy sale of the collapsed invest-
ment bank Bear Stearns to JP Morgan on 16 March 
2008, the risk premium for long-term loans began 
to rise again, although crisis-intensifying systemic 
consequences failed to materialize. The persistent 
demand for liquidity spread around the world, and 
had a sustained negative impact on stock markets. 
Naturally, bank stocks were especially caught in the 
downwards spiral (see Figure 5).
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A new dimension
On 7 September 2008 the US government nationa-
lized Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac because of acute 
liquidity problems. The business model of these two 
listed wholesale banks with implied government 
guarantees consisted of purchasing mortgages and 
refinancing them by issuing structured commercial 
paper.6 Their placing into government receivership 
catapulted the crisis into a new dimension. Invest-
ment banks saw themselves exposed to a torrent of 
liquidity outflow. Speculative short selling put their 
stock values under pressure.7 These combined forces 
first brought the investment bank Lehman Brothers 
to its knees. The US government refused to stage a 
rescue of Lehman and its primarily foreign creditors, 
forcing Lehman to file for bankruptcy protection. 
On September 15 Lehman had to file under chapter 
11 of the US bankruptcy code. 
Lehman’s failure signaled to banks all over the 
world that their fear of losses in the money lending 
market was all too justified. As a result, short-term 
lending between banks quickly ground to a halt. 
The central banks—traditionally, the lenders of last 
resort—now partially became lenders of first re-
sort.8 The range of securities eligible as collateral 
for loans from central banks was widely expanded. 
Despite all these measures, lasting stability was 
not achieved. Commercial bank deposits at the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) rose explosively after 
the Lehman bankruptcy, despite a negative interest 
differential (Figure 6). The functioning of the sy-
stem now depended above all on the availability of 
securities to banks that could be used as collateral 
against central-bank credit.
Government rescue measures
Declining confidence forced governments to an-
nounce large-scale rescue operations. On October 
3, the US Congress passed a 700 billion dollar res-
cue plan. Ireland was the first European nation to 
deploy a rescue parachute for its domestic banks. 
On October 5, the German government announced 
a guarantee for all savings deposits. Then, just two 
weeks later, on October 17, the German government 
adopted a rescue package of nearly 500 billion euros 
6 These US banks own or back five trillion dollars in mortgages. This is 
equal to somewhat less than half of the domestic real estate credit volu-
me of twelve trillion dollars.
7 The seller offers to sell a stock at a particular time without owning it 
and deposits funds as security with the originating bank. Short selling is 
profitable when the market falls and the paper can be bought back at a 
lower price at term. 
8 This especially affected wholesale banks. They have no funds from 
savings or demand deposits at their disposal. This type of bank serves 
as an intermediary for corporate clients, for example, banks and retail 
markets.
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Abbildung 6
Einlagenentwicklung bei der EZB
In Mill. Euro
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for the banking sector, consisting of guarantees, 
equity participation, and the purchase of illiquid 
commercial paper. Meanwhile, the British govern-
ment began the compulsory partial nationalization 
of its most important domestic banks.9
Further national rescue plans followed. The im-
plementation was initially reluctant, however, and 
without international consultation process. The 
European Union agreed both internally and with 
US officials to engage in coordinated crisis ma-
nagement. While the money market is still frozen 
to some extent, the flight from risky assets, and in 
particular from risky investment vehicles continues. 
In the third and the fourth quarter of 2008, hedge 
funds underwent in each quarter a historic decline 
in the volume of assets under management. Single 
Hedge Funds and Funds of Funds lost together 635 
billion dollars in Q3 (Figure 7).10
Agenda for rebuilding financial market 
architecture
The reliance on taxpayer bailouts in this crisis is 
fraught with multiple disincentives and risks. As a 
result, it is only acceptable, at best, over the short 
term. Lasting stabilization of the banking and fi-
nancial sectors can only be achieved by means of 
a reorganization of regulations and, ultimately, of 
the architecture of financial markets. New regu-
latory structures should aim at resolving today’s 
problems without engendering a new set of similar 
difficulties. In the follow section, principles for the 
reorganization of financial markets are presented in 
the form of an agenda. The latest findings in eco-
nomic behavioral research as well as consultations 
with market participants have been drawn upon in 
the formulation of these recommendations.
Agenda Item 1: Minimizing coordination 
failures 
Coordination failures, that is, the inability of ac-
tors to align their actions to the needs of all market 
participants, results in suboptimal equilibria.11 An 
9  Of  the  eight  institutions  originally  targeted,  however,  only  HBOS, 
Lloyds TSB and RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland) have accepted capital in-
jections, which are also associated with specific requirements. Northern 
Rock and Bradford & Bingley have been nationalized completely.
10 According to hedgefund.net, this was the largest drop-off in the hi-
story of the hedge fund industry for each period. Asset Flow Report – Q3 
2008. These figures include double counting, as Funds of Funds are in-
vestors in Single Hedge Funds. However, there is justification for refer-
ring to the gross reduction in assets under management as it accounts 
for the actual loss of business that the Hedge Fund industry suffers from.   
The respective figures for Single Hedge Funds is 421 billion Dollar in 
Q3.  www.hedgefund.net/marketing_index.cfm?template=research/re-
searchfront.cfm  and  http://www.hedgefund.net/publicnews/default.
aspx?story=9809 .
11 Morris and Shin identify the uncoordinated withdrawal of foreign in-
vestors as the cause of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Morris, S, Shin, 
uncoordinated pullout of investors, for example, can 
drive an essentially sound enterprise into bankrupt-
cy.12 In the current crisis, inadequate coordination 
has been a central problem, both at the private and 
government level. 
Minimizing coordination failures in the private sec-
tor requires a reduction in the complexity of securi-
tization instruments and sanctions for mismatched 
maturities. Vertical retention quotas at each level 
of securitization can achieve the first aim.13 Capital 
requirements based on the magnitude of the diver-
gence between investment and financing horizons 
can achieve the second. Vertical retention quotas 
simplify the identification of principal debtors and—
analogous to bank reserve requirements—limit the 
number of levels and, in each case, the amounts 
available for securitization. For example, a 20% 
retention quota for the first creditor and 40% for 
downstream purchasers would permit a maximum 
of only two levels. The securitization volume availa-
ble in the last level shrinks to 40% of the original 
amount of credit. 
The response to coordination failure at the govern-
ment level must be the creation of a governing 
board to establish binding trans-national minimum 
regulatory standards. Similarly, an organization in 
a position to coordinate international measures in 
H.: Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks. 
American Economic Review, 88(3), 1998, 587-597.
12 Hubert, F., Schäfer, D.: Coordination Failure with Multiple Lending. 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 158(2), 2002, 256 ff.
13  The “first loss piece” is a horizontal retention. Vertical retention 
applies to each tranche and defines a portion of the tranche and of the 
whole portfolio that should be kept by the originator of the portfolio.
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the midst of a crisis should be a fundamental ele-
ment of a new architecture. While the establishment 
of standards is a somewhat natural function of the 
Financial Stability Forum,14 coordinating crisis 
management at the international level could help 
the International Momentary Fund to attain new 
significance and authority.
National oversight boards are unable to effectively 
monitor financial conglomerates active on a global 
scale. Only a unified system will be able to detect 
and sanction activities that are off balance sheets and 
regulatory arbitrage that overlaps national borders 
and sectors. Meanwhile, in Europe, the oversight 
agencies are splintered and powerless.15 In terms of 
regulatory oversight, the prevention of coordination 
failures requires a trans-national mandate. This can 
only be achieved through the creation of a European 
financial market oversight system.
14 Cf. Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and 
Institutional Resilience. www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0804.pdf.
15  German Council of Experts (Sachverständigenrat): Annual Report 
2008/9: “Mastering the Financial Crisis – Strengthening the Forces for 
Growth”, 2008. The CESR, Committee of European Security Regulators, 
the  CEBS,  Committee  of  European  Banking  Supervisors,  and  CEIOPS, 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupation Pensions Supervisors 
are working at the European level unconnected with each other.
Agenda Item 2: Forcing Subsidiarity
In opposition to the vision of European-wide finan-
cial market oversight, it is often argued that such 
a structure could never be reconciled with unique 
national requirements in individual financial sec-
tors. The European Central Bank and its affiliated 
national central banks demonstrate, however, that 
a decentralized division of labor under a common 
roof can be functional. The regulation of the regio-
nal banks can be delegated to national organs, with 
an overarching European oversight board assigned 
responsibility for monitoring supranational financial 
market participants as well as national regulatory 
authorities. With the implementation of a two-tiered 
financial oversight system, one could hope for a 
much stronger impetus in the direction of coordi-
nated regulation and oversight in Europe than from 
the Lamfalussy Process currently in effect.16
Agenda Item 3: Putting the right incentives in 
place
The intrinsic roots of the crisis are to be found in 
the lack of controls for ubiquitous “moral hazards” 
in the financial sector. Immediate payment of fees, 
handoff of credit default risks, and lack of transpar-
ency in structured products have created a major 
incentive to drastically lower standards for credit 
16 www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht_cebs_lamfalussy.php
Prevailing practices in securitization are a nearly inex-
haustible source of coordination failures.1 Multiple layers 
of stratification and inadequate documentation compli-
cate the identification of debtors, the volume of debt, 
and collateral. In this way, efforts to reduce defaults of 
distressed borrowers through the formation of creditor 
pools and through debt restructuring are doomed to 
failure.2 Both parties, the debtor on mortgage in the USA 
and the bank that eventually holds the security that is 
over several intermediate stages connected with the in-
dividual mortgage are unable to initiate a debt workout. 
The addressee for a possible renegotiation of contract 
terms is neither identifiable nor accessible. 
1  A  damage  claim  brought  against  Deutsche  Bank  illustrates  the 
increased problems of coordination caused by securitization. The ex-
tension of 640 million dollars in financing borrowed by Donald Trump 
fell through. Trump has charged Deutsche Bank with selling pieces 
of the loan to too many investors. – Cf. Donald Trump verklagt Deut-
sche  Bank.  www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken-versiche-
rungen/donald-trump-verklagt-deutsche-bank;2083309.
2 Creditor pools are traditionally an instrument designed to prevent 
coordination  failures  and  a  stampede  of  creditors.  Cf.  Brunner,  A., 
Krahnen, J. P.: Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on 
Debt Restructuring. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 75(2), 2008, 
415-442.
The behavior of investors additionally complicates the 
picture. The mismatching of maturities in investment 
and financing multiply the probability of a liquidity crisis 
at maturity and, thus, an uncoordinated investor flight. 
In the run-up to the current crisis, a deregulatory “race to 
the bottom” had been underway for many years. The US 
and UK in particular resisted coordination and instead 
relied upon lower standards of regulation to enlarge com-
petitive advantages. With the passage of the first rescue 
package after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was 
also an international scramble for the best possible exit 
positions. The UK, for example, had to contend with a 
massive outflow of deposits after the Irish government 
hastily announced a guarantee for its domestic banks. 
Because of the precipitant Irish move, other EU states 
also felt compelled to increase the level of their own 
guarantees.3
3 Cf in addition Zimmermann, K. F.: Coordinating International Re-
sponses to the Crisis. DIW Berlin’s Weekly Report, Number 42/2008, 
Documentation.
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approval at the expense of investors at the end of 
the securitization chain. Mandatory requirements 
for issuers to bear a portion of default risk by means 
of retention quotas would contribute to eliminating 
this incentive. 
Cheap outside capital led banks to use extreme le-
verage. This resulted in a risk loving behavior in 
investment firms, and a large exposure of equity to 
default risk. With a high reliance on outside debt 
capital, a firm’s equity is quickly wiped out when its 
investment return is lower than the cost of servicing 
its debts. The establishment of a fund that would 
balance bonuses for bank managers during profi-
table years with losses during unprofitable years 
and pay out the net bonus after no less than three 
to five years would likely exert a dampening effect 
on the incentive to use excessive leverage. More 
transparency and better corporate governance would 
also be provided if regulators had knowledge of 
the bonus systems in place for bank managers and 
shareholders had to approve compensation packages 
at their annual meetings.
The estimation of default risk provided by rating 
agencies is essential for the functioning of structured 
products. Agencies systematically overrated the va-
lue of structured portfolios. Flawed risk assessment 
models and compensation systems are responsible 
for this. Payment for rating and consultation services 
by the issuers of structured products also creates 
incentives for collusion.17 It is known that many 
agencies kept adjusting their ratings until the tranche 
ratings given meet the wishes of the issuers.18 
Incentives for collusion could be significantly at-
tenuated by tying the compensation received by 
credit agencies to the accuracy of their predictions, 
the introduction of a registration requirement, and 
by requiring the disclosure of forecasts made by 
the rating agencies. The major loss in credibility 
suffered by credit rating agencies still leaves doubt, 
however, as to whether a sole reliance on private 
companies to issue credit ratings will be sufficient 
to quickly restore lost confidence. 
Agenda Item 4: Using the credibility of 
governments to rate debt
Only government entities currently possess suffi-
cient credibility to stabilize the banking system. 
With the creation of a non-profit rating agency at 
17 Tirole, J.: Collusion and the Theory of Organizations. In: Laffont, J. J 
(ed.). Advances in Economic Theory: Proceedings of the Sixth World Con-
gress of the Econometric Society Vol 2. Cambridge 1992, 151-20.
18 Cf also United States Security and Exchange Commission: Summary 
Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Se-
lect Credit Rating Agencies. www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexa-
mination070808.pdf.
the European level, this credibility could be put to 
good use for a transitionary period of several years. 
Issuers of structured products sold in Europe would 
be required to contract such a public agency for 
one of two necessary ratings.19 More competition 
to provide the best ratings would result. The funda-
mentals for constructing a public rating agency are 
already in place in the euro zone. Under the roof of 
the ECB, the national central banks already operate 
credit-rating departments. 
Agenda Item 5: Don’t place excessive demands 
on the government
The realization that in the face of huge systemic 
uncertainty only national economies acting as a 
whole can guarantee sufficient certainty also entails 
the risk of “overshooting the mark” in redefining 
the role of the government in the financial sector. 
Germany is a good example of the fact that govern-
ment as proprietor of financial organizations can be 
confronted with massive problems of governance. 
This is evident from the business policies of many 
state-owned banks at the level of the federal states 
(Landesbanken). The dominant business model of 
these banks —which is supported by, and some-
times even initiated by the government actors—to 
operate as a primarily international, wholesale bank 
has proved to be unsustainable. Strengthening the 
role of the government as regulator and supervisor 
is appropriate. It would be inappropriate, however, 
to additionally burden the government with direct 
operating responsibility for the banking sector.
Agenda Item 6: Preventing misuse of 
government responsibility
The government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were profit-oriented mortgage fi-
nance companies with implicit government gua-
rantees. Government backing of this nature defeats 
any incentive for due diligence in the selection of 
investment projects and business partners; in additi-
on, private insurance against default makes no sense 
in the face of an implicit (and thus free) government 
guarantee. Government backing serves instead as a 
huge incentive to pursue a high-risk business model. 
This  risk-loving behavior is not penalized on the 
refinancing market by appropriate risk surcharges. 
As a result, it can be assumed that a high-risk but 
government insured model will “crowd out” risk-
appropriate private business models. Should one 
wish to exclude “charity hazards” from the finance 
sector in the future,20 there must no longer be any 
19 The US stock market oversight agency, the SEC, only accepts Standard 
& Poors, Moody’s and Fitch. These three agencies have a quasi-monopoly 
with respect to CDOs.
20  The concept of a “charity hazard” is typically used in connection Agenda for a New  Financial Market Architecture
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private financial service providers with government 
guarantees when the crisis has been eventually over-
come.
Agenda Item 7: Accounting for non-
renegotiation-proof contracts 
A contractual design is said to be renegotiation-proof 
if it is robust against renegotiation both before and 
after it is executed.21 If it is not renegotiation-proof, 
the goal of the contract cannot be obtained.22 The 
removal of risk from bank balance sheets through 
outsourcing to legally independent special purpose 
vehicles or to hedge funds must be seen as a contract 
that lacks renegotiation-proof. For if default risks 
materialize, as has occurred in the current crisis, the 
issuing banks are regularly forced to reassume onto 
their own balance sheets the risks that they had pu-
tatively handed off. Similar uncertainties regarding 
the removal of risk are also associated with credit 
default insurance, especially if the independence of 
the rating agencies from the issuer is questionable. 
If losses occur with greater than expected frequency, 
smooth loss adjustment on the part of the insurance 
provider is unlikely. Due to the latent potential of 
risks returning to bank balance sheets, regulatory 
authorities in the future must handle them as though 
they had never been swapped out. This presupposes 
registration and authorization of special purpose ve-
hicles by oversight entities, as well as transparency 
regarding the management of portfolio risks.
Agenda item 8: Avoid excessively broad 
regulation
Despite the many sides to the problems faced by 
the financial sector, the desire to enact blunt and 
wide-sweeping regulations must be resisted. Inter-
national financial conglomerates need a different 
oversight framework than regionally active mid-
sized banks. National development banks need to 
be regulated differently than private commercial 
banks. The implementation of adequate and specific 
regulations for hedge funds and private equity funds 
is particularly important. The problem of a single 
unified system to regulate both of these financial 
intermediaries can be demonstrated by conside-
ring rules surrounding capital requirements. While 
hedge funds are indebted at the fund level, takeovers 
by private equity firms are usually based upon a 
construction in which the share of loan financing in 
the purchase price is carried forward directly to the 
with the effects of implicit government guarantees for flood victims. It 
describes their unwillingness to obtain private insurance for their endan-
gered property at the water’s edge.
21 Bolton, P.: „Renegotiation and the Dynamics of Contract Design,“ Eu-
ropean Economic Review 34, 1990, 303-310.
22  Schäfer, D.: “Hausbankbeziehung und optimale Finanzkontrakte.” 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge, Volume 190, 2003.
acquired company.23 Fixing a standard for capital 
requirements would achieve its intended goal for 
hedge funds by limiting leveraged financing, but 
in the case of private equity firms, this would lead 
to undesired restrictive capital equity requirements 
for companies outside the financial sector.
Agenda item 9: A greater emphasis on equity 
financing
The crisis began with the lowering of standards 
for credit approval and the abolition of any kind of 
financial constraints for many parties, in particular 
US private households. The enormity of the crisis 
is due in turn to the widely spread practice of heavy 
leveraging. Lasting stabilization of the system is 
unthinkable without the return of more equity based 
financing to private economic units, whether they 
be highly indebted households, or businesses, or 
financial intermediaries. Furthermore, politicians 
and the general public need to interpret financing 
restrictions for individuals and firms based upon 
poor creditworthiness as protective of the system, 
and not as a damaging form of credit restraint.
Conclusion
Since the summer of 2007, participants in the finan-
cial markets have found themselves in a situation of 
undeterminable risk in making decisions (so-called 
Knightian uncertainty), and therefore in a regulative 
dilemma. The basic axiom that bad business practice 
leads to insolvency must stand aside in favor of the 
goal of preventing the fall of a bank at any cost. 
If this reversal of principles is ignored, and—for 
reasons justified from a regulatory perspective—
the rescue of a system-relevant bank like Lehmann 
Brothers is denied, then the consequences for system 
stability are often devastating. In order to achieve the 
goal of lasting restoration of system stability, over 
the next few months the architecture of financial 
markets must be redesigned. There are numerous 
possible wrong turns in this process. Many might 
be avoided if the principles presented here are taken 
into account, beginning with the principle of mini-
mizing sources of coordination failures, continuing 
with a redefinition of the government’s role, and 
finally, with the placement of a greater emphasis 
on equity financing.
23 Schäfer, D., Fisher, A.: “Fear of Financial Investors unjustified.” Weekly 
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